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ABSTRACT

Online auctions were the most notable survivors of the ‘Internet Bubble Burst’ phenomenon that hit e-commerce related
businesses at the turn of the millennium. With most online auctions lasting between 1 and 9 days, not all bidders have the
time to monitor the progress of an auction for such long periods. In addition, many bidders in online auctions are new to the
bidding game, leaving them at a disadvantage in the bidding process. Bidding agents that can place bids in the absence of a
bidder can ameliorate the deficiencies of this mercantile process. In this paper we review the various bidding agents presently
used by various auction houses and classify them based on their characteristics. We critique the bid composition process of
bidding agents and the incentives for bidders to use them. We also contrast the functionality of existing online bidding
agents and proposed theoretical models.
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INTRODUCTION

As an effort to add value to the online auction mercantile process, online auction companies provide access to automatic
bidding agents and auction management software for participating clients’. Initially, the development of automated bidding
agents was aimed at providing bidders in online auctions with participation options that would potentially reduce the
opportunity cost of participating in online auctions. This was appealing because the online auctions tended to take longer than
their traditional counterparts, and thus, the opportunity cost of participating in online auctions was high. However, as the size
and popularity of the online auction market grew, the complexity of participating in online auctions increased. For example,
simultaneous auctions with substitutable items are commonplace, and bidders have an incentive to leverage the performance
of one auction to another in their favor. Intelligent bidding agents that are capable of maximizing bidders’ participation utility
in such complex market environments have become a virtue.
In this paper, we take stock of bidding agents that are currently being used on various online auction sites. We study the
services they provide as well as their design. We provide a classification of bidding agents for online auctions. The
classification identifies three distinct classes of bidding agents: Auction Site Bidding Agents (ASBA); Third Party Hosted
Agents (TPBA), and Desktop Bidding Agents (DTBA). We list examples of agents currently found in each of these
categories and provide a summary of the services that each agent provides. Finally, we analyze the different bidding agents
and make proposals for their improvement. Our classification and analysis of the bidding agents is based on economic theory
of incentive alignment (Ba, Stallaert, Whinston, 2001; Ito, Hattori, Shintani. 2003).
In the rest of the paper we review pertinent literature, identify the various features and the services offered by the bidding
agents, classify them based on the service providers and provide insights and critique in to their working.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

Bidding agents for online auctions were initially developed to replace fairly procedural bidding functions. With the increased
use of online auctions as a mercantile process, the need for more sophisticated bidding agents that mimic real bidders has
become apparent (Gregg and Walczak, 2003). In an experimental game that tested the performance of different bidding
agents (Greenwald and Stone, 2001) the best scoring agents had aggressive bidding strategies and risk in their portfolio
management. This experiment indicates that bidding agents will need to incorporate information processing capabilities that
build up a knowledge base enabling bidders to intelligently deviate from a price takers strategy, where the markets sets a
price for the product and the bidder is not in a position to influence it.
A competitive bidding agent that uses private information in bidding, a price modeling agent that uses the price histories in
determining its bidding strategies, and a bidder modeling agent that uses the bidding histories of other bidders in determining
its own bidding strategies have been modeled (Hu, Reeves, Wong, 1999). Their findings on the performance of these bidding
agents show that good agents will have to utilize multiple strategies that require different sources of data.
There are numerous examples in the literature of bidding agents that are able to learn from the auction environment (Viet and
Czernohous, 2003; Dumas, Aldred, Governatori, Hofstede and Russell, 2002; Jalali-Sohi and Malkewitz, 2001). These
studies utilize Bayesian networks to represent the auction information and provide different applications of the acquired
knowledge in the creation of bidding rules and strategies for automated bidding agents. We find a big gap between the
current practice in the implementation of bidding agents and the proposed theoretical models.
Most of the literature on bidding agents has focused on agents that participate in single auctions. However, online auctions
have been observed to occur simultaneously. That is, it has become common place to identify more than one auction for a
similar or substitutable product running at the same time. One common bidding strategy in such situations is to hedge the
participation in one auction to the performance of another auction (Plott and Salmon, 2004; Anthony, 1999).
Finally, we would like to highlight the importance of human agent inter-play in the bidding environment. While most of the
studies that model bidding agents assume that bidding agents will be competing against other bidding agents, typical online
auctions entertain participation from both bidding agents and human bidders. This interplay of agents and human beings
infuses additional complexities to the auction agent design (Garcia, Lopes, Bentes, 2001).

CURRENT STATE OF BIDDING AGENTS

We turn our attention to the current state of bidding agents for online auctions and discuss their features and services. The
bidding agents list was compiled through online search and message board browsing on auction houses1 and sites that provide
downloads of freeware, shareware and trial software for auctions2. We identified the various features and services that these
agents provide to the bidders and classified then in to three groups based on the service provider.
Features and Services of Bidding Agents

All bidding agents require some start-up steps to be undertaken by the bidder. The most important step is to choose the
maximum bid value. The maximum bid serves as a reservation bound on a bidder’s willingness to pay. Bidding agents
continuously submit a bid on behalf of the bidder, whenever the bidder is outbid and the winning bid is below the reservation
price. This iterative process continues until the participating bidder has either won the auction or the bid is above his
reservation price.
This basic service of incremental bidding provided by the bidding agents is supplemented by a variety of additional services
at different levels in different bidding agents. In this section we describe the services provided by different agents, and later
provide a classification of bidding agents.
1.

1
2

Continuous Automatic Bidding: When the bidder chooses the bidding agent as a proxy, the agent takes over the bidding
responsibilities by continuously ensuring that the bidder is winning the auction at the lowest possible winning bid. All
the identified participate by submitting the minimum required bid below the reservation price.

www.ebay.com;amazon.com;auctions.yahoo.com;ubid.com;
www.ebaysofwarereview.com
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2.

Max-Price Retraction: Max-Price retraction is defined as the feature of an auction agent, which would either allow or
restrict the users from changing their maximum price limit (the reservation price or the maximum willingness to pay).
Since the length of online auctions varies between a few hours to up to ten days, the bidder’s ability to modify his
reservation price over time is significant. All the auction agents allow a user to modify the max-price limit anytime
during the auction as long as the new revised reservation price is above the current bid.

3.

Sniping: Sniping is a biding strategy where bidders wait until the final moments of the auction to place their bid. When
the auction duration is fixed, this strategy maximizes the bidder surplus since counter bids from competing bidders will
be time barred by the auctioneer.

4.

Automatic Feedback: This is feature of convenience provided by third party bidding agents that allow a bidder to track
winning auctions and consequently leave feedback for the seller. The agents prompt the user to leave feedback when
ever they are used thus reducing the chances of the user overlooking feedback submissions, which has lead to the other
party in the transaction leaving negative or neutral feedback for the user being a poor communicator.

5.

Automatic notification of Winning or losing bid: Automatic notification is a feature of bidding agents that
communicates the results of an auction with the bidder, using alternative modes of communication like e-mail. Two
messages commonly communicated; (i) when the bidder is losing and the auction price exceeded the bidder’s reservation
price; and (ii) when the auction closes, the agent sends a message informing the bidder of the auction outcome.

6.

Feedback Filter: Many sellers on auction houses like eBay and Yahoo have feedbacks running into thousands, which
makes it difficult for bidders to go through each page searching for the negative and neutral feedbacks. Many third party
automatic bidding agents help the bidder overcome this problem by gathering and displaying the neutral and negative
feedbacks about the seller, thus giving the bidder insight into particular problems that others had with that seller.

7.

Multiple Auction Monitoring: The agent could be configured to monitor multiple auctions for a substitutable item and
participate in one auction at a time. It would stop its monitoring as well as participation in the other auctions when the
bidder has won one of the auctions below his reservation price.

8.

Usage cost: Agents provided by the auctioneers are free and the users are encouraged to use bidding agents for
participating in auctions. Third party agents charge a fee as monthly subscription (Powersnipe.com, Auctionsniper.com)
or commission or percentage of the winning bid (eSnipe.com) or one time software licensing fee as is the case of most
desktop bidding agents (Cricket Jr., Auction Sentry etc…).

9.

Shill-Bid Activity Detection: Shill bidding is the process where the auctioneer’s proxy participates in the auction to drive
the price up. Some of the third parties bidding agents provide options to bidders to search all the previous and current
available auctions of a seller, looking for suspicious activity like a single bidder bidding in many of the sellers’ auctions
indicating possible shill-bid activity.

Classification of Bidding Agents

Intelligent E-Commerce Agents as described by Wagner and Turban (2002), present a broad variety of agents that have been
classified or organized based on the functions they perform like search, buy, sell, and negotiate. Wang (1999) broadly
classifies the functions that need to be supported in E-Commerce in to eight distinct categories, which in turn are
accomplished, by an individual or a group of Intelligent Agents. They have also been organized in to three distinct groups by
Maes et al. (1999) depending on the functions they perform in the CBB (Consumer Buyer Behavior), with each group
corresponding to one of the stages in CBB (Product Brokering, Merchant Brokering and Negotiation). Hendler (1999) also
attempts a general classification of the agents by function in to Problem-solving agents, User-Centric agents, Control agents
and Transaction agents. In this paper we look at the bidding agents and attempt to classify the existing bidding agents based
on their functionality and service provider, which are critical for buyers surplus maximization and auctioneer revenue
maximization. Even though each bidding agent has a distinct advantage in comparison with the other group, we will try to
analyze each type based on whose advantages outweigh the others.
The current online auction market place is being serviced by bidding agents that fall in three distinct categories. The first
category is made up of agents that are owned and operated by the auctioneers. We refer to these as Auction Site Bidding
Agents (ASBA’s). These agents require bidders to indicate the maximum price that they are willing to bid in an auction.
Some online auctions call it the bidder’s reservation price. If a bidder’s reservation price for an item is higher than the current
winning bid, the auction site provides the bidder with the services of a bidding agent that continuously bids on user’s behalf.
Each time that a bidder is outbid, the bidding agent submits bids that conform to the auctioneers minimum required bid. This
process repeats until the auction closes or the bid value is higher than the bidder’s indicated reservation price.
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Features/Services Provided by Agents (1– 9)

Agent Name
(Web Site)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Ebay

Free

Yahoo

Free

Ubid

Free

Amazon

Free

9

Figure 1: Services Provided by Auction Site Bidding Agents1

Based on the services described under Features and Service of Bidding Agents, ASBA’s provide bidders with continuous
bidding (1), automatic notification of change in auction status (5), and capability to monitor multiple auctions (7). Even
though these agents are free to use, they restrict the bidder’s ability to lower his/her reservation price once submitted, even if
it is above the current winning bid.
The second class of bidding agents is the Third Party Bidding Agents (TPBA). These are independent dedicated web servers
that run or parse the software agents that bid on behalf of the auction participant. They function independent of the auction
houses and have no affiliation with them. All except one among the TPBA’s, service bidders participating on eBay.com
alone. Perplexed by this lack of third party bidding agents for other auction sites, we contacted a service provider
(www.sniperight.com), who explained that only ebay.com has enough bidder volume for the development of a bidding agent
to make economic sense. The exception was eSnipe that provides services for bidders on both eBay and Yahoo based on
custom requests. Figure 2 below, summarizes the services provided by the different agents that we found in this class.
From the table below we can see that all the TPBA’s provide services for Continuous Automatic Bidding (1), Maximum
price retraction (2) and Sniping (3)3. Automatic Notification of winning or losing bid (5) and Multiple Auction Monitoring
(7) are provided by all the TPBA’s except eSnipe, which we found out to be a basic sniping service for eBay and Yahoo with
out any other features that other TPBA’s provide. Among the TPBA’s, Bidnapper and PhantomBidder provide the most
comprehensive set of features and services that that includes Automatic Feedback (4) and Feedback Filter (6). All the
TPBA’s charge a fee from the user based on the final auction winning price or monthly subscription for the usage of their
services. It is also important to mention that the commission that these agents charged the user for winning the auction was
not significant and generally was capped between $5 and $10.
The last class of bidding agents is the Desktop Bidding Agents (DTBA). These agents reside on the bidder’s computer and
retrieve auction information from the auction site. The current DTBA’s use what is popularly called scraping approach
(requiring a separate script for retrieving information from each auction house) to communicate with the auction house. We
observed that the service providers have generally been reliable in providing software upgrades based on changes made by
the auction house to its standards.
The DTBA’s provide most of the features and services that other bidding agents provide. One of the often cited drawbacks of
the DTBA’s by their competitors is that the bidder has to leave the computer turned on and connected to the internet the
whole auction time. Some of the DTBA’s try to overcome this drawback by designing their agents to be able to connect to
the internet a few minutes before the auction ends and start bidding on the item. Even though this counters part of the
argument of the competitors, it still does not overcome the problem of the bidder remembering to turn on the computer before
the auction. The DTBA providers charge users a one time licensing fee or a yearly fee for their use. All the DTBA’s observed
here provide most of the services listed with the exception being Bidslayer.

3

Even though all of the TPBA’s give the option of retracting the maximum bid limit, they restrict this option to a few
minutes before the auction.
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Features/Services Provided by Agents (3.1.1 – 3.1.9)

Target Site

Agent Name
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Auction Sniper

% Winning Bid

eBay

eSnipe

% Winning Bid

eBay, yahoo

Bidnapper

Subscription Option

eBay

Phantom Bidder

Fixed Price/ Winning bid

eBay

Powersnipe

Subscription Option

eBay

Bidslammer

% Winning Bid

eBay

Figure 2: Services Provided by Third Party Hosted Bidding Agents

Features/Services Provided by Agents (3.1.1 – 3.1.9)
Agent Name

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Target
Site

Cricket Jr.

Fixed

eBay

Auction Sentry

Fixed

eBay

Bidslayer

Fixed

eBay

Sniperight

/Year

eBay

Figure 3: Services Provided by Desktop Bidding Agents
INSIGHTS AND CRITIQUE

Bidding agents will continue to play a central role in the online auction business. Although their model has evolved in
tandem with technological developments of the internet infrastructure, our research on existing auction bidding agents shows
that developments in this budding industry still lag behind the theoretical proposals of bidding agents that have been
advanced. In this section, we provide insights into some of these differences, their causes, and propose remedial measures to
overcome this difference. We discuss these insights under (i) auctioneer incentives to support bidding agents; (ii)
diversification of bidding strategies; and (iii) intermediation incentives.
Auctioneer Incentives to Support Bidding Agents

The dominant players in the online auction market have a significant impact in the success of supporting innovations, such as
bidding agents. We have seen that the ASBA’s have flourished, mainly because they have the blessings of their parent
auction sites. However TPBA’s and DTBA’s, where we believe the future lies, are struggling to interact with auction sites.
The development of integration standards and protocols for third party agents is a crucial cooperative initiative that is
required of online auctioneers in order to create an enabling environment for the development of online auction bidding
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agents. Although such standards and protocols are required, they will open up both challenges and opportunities we discuss
here. Our analysis indicates that the incentives for supporting online bidding agents, especially third part bidding agents, are
not apparent to the auctioneers.
Third party agents pose a significant business challenge to the online auction business. These third party agent sites can
easily transform into aggregator sites that would use automatic search agents to sift through various auction offers, collect
information and display it on their websites. Ebay.com successfully sued an aggregator site in 2000 citing various reasons,
which it claimed were harmful for its business. Among the reasons advanced by EBay were that the these sites displayed
outdated information which lowed auction users purchasing experience, and at the same time overloaded EBay’s own servers
through frequent use of their search agents (Wagner and Turban, 2002).
The second challenge that third party agents pose to the auction house is that, by intermediating consumer access to the
auction website, they could potentially affect advertising revenue which is a significant portion of the revenues in the online
auction industry (ebay.com reported 7% ($54.9 Million) of net revenues from online advertising in 2002).
On the positive side, establishment of standards and protocols for cooperative bidding agent interaction will see the
development of third party auction bidding agents, in an environment that is devoid of incentive conflicts between bidders
and auctioneers that plague the ASBA’s, giving bidder an incentive to disclose their true willingness to pay and set higher
reservation prices.
Standardization will also provide a potential for the creation of agents that can participate in multiple auctions. This would
expose the auction to a larger audience and increase participation in the auction. Although there is the concern that the
bidders could hedge their reservation price to the lowest price in all the auctions they are participating in, the exposure to a
larger audience in itself is good for ascending price auctions (Klemperer 2003).
Bidding agents will inevitable reduce the number of personal visits that bidders make to the auction sites, perhaps to a
maximum of two visits. During first visit the bidder will identify and evaluate the item on offer. Using this information, other
private and secondary information, the bidder will proceed to configure the bidding agent. The bidder may make a second
personal visit to collect post auction information, which the bidding agent did not communicate. We do not preclude the
possibility of other visits, especially depending on the features of the bidding agent, but this typical bidder-agent-auction
interaction serves to underscore the effect of reduced click through rates that auctioneers fear might affect their online
advertising revenues. It is worthy to note that this trend will be witnessed for all agent supported bidding activity including
that of ASBA’s that are supported by the auction site. In supporting standardized agent protocols, the shift of agent bidding
activity will be from ASBA’s to TPBA’s and DTBA’s, which are more aligned with bidder’s incentives and will not have
any net effect on the expected click through rates and hence advertising revenue.
In an environment where flexible standards and protocols for agent-auction interaction exist, auction sites that are fearful of
the uncontrolled practices of autonomous third parties bidding agents, can establish sister companies that handle the bidding
agent work. With an appropriate business model, these entities can maximize their revenues, while serving the bidders’ as
their principal.
Diversification of Bidding Strategies

There are two bidding strategies that are currently offered by the bidding agents that we studied: (i) minimum required bid
and (ii) Sniping. With the minimum required bid strategy, the bidding agent submits a bid that is equal to the minimum
required bid set by the auctioneer. This strategy is optimal if all bidders use the same strategy. However, a typical online
auction will have a mix of bidders using agents and some who physically participate in the auction and adopt more complex
bidding strategies. In such an environment, using the minimum bid increment may result in sub-optimal results.
Sniping strategies optimize the bidders expected surplus by submitting the minimum required bid close to auction end time.
This is a strategy practiced widely in the non-agent online auction environment (Bapna et.al 2001). When a number of agents
are configured to snipe on behalf of their bidders, the probability of winning reduces and in an auction format where the
closing time is extended based on bidding activity, sniping results in intense bidding activity towards the end of the auction,
without any significant advantage to any of the bidding agents. There is also a chance of the sniping strategy causing
discontent for the auctioneer and there have been instances of negative feedback left for snipers (www.sniperight.com). Some
of the latest sniping tools try to shield the user from these negative reactions of the auctioneer by sending small probing bids
through out the auction with out causing a significant change in the auction price. Regardless of these modifications, we do
not see any strategic advantages that the current bidding strategies provide to the principals.
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There are numerous theoretical proposals for agent biddings strategies based on adaptive bidding strategy and q-learning
(Viet and Czernohous, 2003; Greenwald and Stone, 2001). These agents utilized a variety of bidding strategies, some akin to
the sniping strategy already discussed, while others employed more sophisticated strategies that utilize artificial intelligence
heuristics to determine optimal bidding strategies. Additionally, these agents were developed to participate in combinatorial
auctions. A proposal where bidders in simultaneous auctions submit bids driven by two principles: surplus maximization and
bid minimization, lend itself easily to agent automation (Plott and Salmon, 2003). Indeed, there are numerous theoretical
proposals that serve as a base for the development of bidding agents that utilize diverse bidding strategies. The challenge
remains to bring these agent proposals to fruition, by integrating them into bidding agents used in online auctions. Part of the
challenge as discussed above has been the need for a co-operative effort to create an enabling environment by setting up
standards and protocols for the interaction of bidding agents and the auction sites.
Intermediation Incentives

One positive development in the bidding agent field has been the creation of third party enterprises that provide bidding agent
services. Agents of third party entities such as Auction Sniper, Bidnapper, and PhantomBidder provide users with web
interfaces that allow bidders to configure them and agents such as Cricket Jr and Auction Sentry are software that can be
downloaded onto bidder’s computers and configured to proxy bid. On observing the services that these agents provide, the
limitation that we mention in sections 4.1 and 4.2 are evident.
These developments, although in their nascent stage, are significant because the overall business model is sustainable and the
incentives are well aligned. Note that effective and efficient bidding agents have bidders as their principal and have to
optimize the bidder’s objective. The bidder’s principal objective is to win an auction at the lowest possible price. When the
agent development business is left to the auctioneer, he will provide support and develop features that support the
auctioneers’ objective, which is to extract the maximum surplus from bidders, and in the process maximize revenue. Thus
we can argue that a feasible business framework for the development of bidding agents exits and it is away from the
auctioneer.
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

From our review of existing bidding agents for online auctions, we conclude that there is significant gap between the
‘theoretically proposed and experimentally tested agents’ and ‘existing online bidding agents’. This observation is especially
supported by the fact that online auctions provide only one type of bidding agent that use a static minimum bid increment to
compose bids. Recent improvements in internet technologies create an enabling environment for the deployment of more
sophisticated third party bidding agents.
Bidding agent service in online auctions have traditionally been provided by the auction houses, creating an obvious conflict
of information sharing between the auctioneer and the bidder. In our review, we identified several emerging third party
bidding agents that will result in increased bidder confidence, because the agents will be more aligned to the objectives of
their principals. The development of third party bidding agents is however limited by the co-operation of auction houses to
provide interfaces that can facilitate the integration of third-party bidding agents. Auctioneers can provide Web-Services that
support the development of third party bidding agents. Besides addressing the exact specifications of such Web-Service, it
has to be clear to the auctioneers that the resultant auction environment will benefit them. We are currently undertaking
research in this aspect.
Finally, we observed that companies in the online auction business accrue some revenues from advertising. Naturally, the
scope for this business opportunity is inversely related to the extent to which bidding agents are used. By reviewing the
financial statements of some of the online auction companies, it was evident that the streams of advertising revenues have
recently been declining. From a business opportunity perspective, the exact benefits of enhanced use of bidding agents will
have to be evaluated against such losses.
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